Weber, Shafir, and Blais (2004) advocate use of the coefficient of variation (CV) as a measure of risk sensitivity and apply CV in a meta-analysis of data for risky choices by humans and animals. We critically re-examine the CV measure as either a normative or descriptive criterion for decision under risk. CV fails as a normative criterion because it violates first order stochastic dominance. Whether or not CV succeeds as a descriptive criterion depends on its consistency or inconsistency with data from experiments designed to test its distinctive properties. We report an experiment with human subjects motivated by salient monetary payoffs. The data are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the CVs of risky lotteries are a significant determinant of subjects' choices between the lotteries and certain payoffs.
of the dimension-invariant CV ( ) X , instead of Var ( ) X or SD ( ) X , in predicting risk sensitivity in humans and lower animals.
We critically re-examine the Weber, et al. CV measure of risk sensitivity. We ask whether CV can provide either a credible normative criterion for decision under risk or a descriptive criterion of decision making in risky environments.
The CV measure only provides a measure of risk sensitivity that is distinct from SD when it is applied to risks with distinct EVs. If application of CV were to be restricted to comparisons across choice alternatives with the same EV then it would produce a measure that was identical to SD except for an irrelevant scale factor. Thus we consider using CV as a measure of riskiness across gambles with distinct EVs. Consider two risky choice options with random returns, X and .
is preferred to option X by individual j according to the CV measure of risk sensitivity (Weber, et al., pgs. 433, 443 ).
We analyze CV as a criterion for decision under risk. We first ask whether choosing among risky alternatives according to their ordering by CV would promote the self-interest of the decision maker. In other words, we ask whether CV provides a (credible) normative criterion for decision under risk that is consistent with monotonicity of preferences, as in the criterion of firstorder stochastic dominance (Hadar and Russell, 1969; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970 ).
Subsequently, we report an experiment, with financially motivated human decision makers, designed to provide a direct test for consistency of subjects' decisions under risk with use of CV as a decision criterion.
Can the CV Measure Provide a Normative Criterion for Decision under Risk?
We here ask whether the CV measure of risk sensitivity can provide a credible normative criterion for decision under risk. We show that the CV measure cannot provide a credible normative criterion for choosing between non-degenerate lotteries because it is inconsistent with first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD). 1 Consistency with FOSD is the most basic requirement for rational choice over risky alternatives because it follows from positive monotonicity of the agent's objective function in the reward medium. An animal that "prefers" to increase its fitness should make risky foraging choices that are consistent with FOSD. 2 A human who prefers more money to less should make financial choices that are consistent with FOSD. 
Substituting expressions for EV and CV yields
0 (( 1) ) (( 1 ) )
Hence, statement (2) is equivalent to (6) ( )
For any given n, k, u( ⋅ ), and b, the left hand side of the last inequality is a finite number, say C.
The right-hand side has limit 0 for p close to 1, so, we can always find a p such that
L is preferred to option n k L + for some p. This is inconsistent with positive monotonicity of preferences.
As an example, for any given
Then, statement (6) is satisfied.
Consider option A, a binary lottery that pays 2 with probability 1/2 and 4 with probability 1/2.
Let option B be the binary lottery with 1/2 probabilities of payoffs of 2 and 6. It is easiest to think of these numbers as referring to amounts of money but that interpretation is not necessary for our 
( ) ( )
so, in that case, the agent prefers option A to option B. But this conclusion is inconsistent with the self-interest of any agent who is not satiated in the reward medium because the only difference between the two gambles is that the high payoff equals 4 in option A and 6 in option B.
This demonstrates that CV cannot provide a credible normative criterion for decision under risk because, by violating first-order stochastic dominance, it would require in some contexts that animals make choices that are inconsistent with increasing fitness and humans make choices that are inconsistent with preferring more money to less.
Can the CV Measure Provide a Descriptive Model for Decision under Risk?
Although the CV measure of risk sensitivity is inconsistent with fitness-maximizing and wealthmaximizing decision making under risk, perhaps it is nevertheless consistent with how agents actually make decisions. Weber, et al. estimate parameters that fit SD and CV measures to data from many experiments and conclude that CV fits the data better. We ask a different question than parameter fitting. We design an experiment on choice under risk that provides a direct test for the effects of CV on subjects' willingness to take risks.
Experimental Design
The decision task is to choose between two options in each of six decision pages. One of the six decision pages of each subject is randomly chosen for money payoff by rolling a die in the presence of the subject. On each decision page, a subject is asked to circle A, B, or I, thereby indicating a choice of option A or option B or indifference. Subjects are told that if they circle I then the experimenter will choose option A or option B for them. Subject instructions and decision pages (or response forms) are included in the appendix. The decision pages are given to each subject in an independently drawn random order. Subjects have access to all six decision pages while making each decision. Table 1 reports the six decision tasks in the experiment. In Task 1, for example, a subject is asked to choose between $7 for sure and the binary lottery that pays $2.50 if ball 1 is drawn from the bingo cage or pays $7.50 if ball 2, 3,…,9, or 10 is drawn. Table 1 The Spearman test and the graphs in Figure 1 use aggregate data. Perhaps the effects of subject heterogeneity mask the effects of CV on individuals' willingness to take risks. The Model I Probit column of Table 2 reports results from a random effects probit analysis of the data in which observations for each individual subject comprise a "group" of observations. The Spearman test, probit analysis, and logit analysis all support the same conclusion: the CV of risky lotteries does not have a significant effect on decisions by subjects in our experiment.
We conclude that the CV measure of risk sensitivity does not provide either a credible normative criterion for decision under risk or a descriptive model consistent with subjects' actual decision making in the risky environment of our experiment.
Endnotes
* We wish to thank Jerome R. Busemeyer for helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier version.
1. Let F and G be two cumulative probability distributions of payoffs defined on the set Ω . Strict first order stochastic dominance of F over G is defined by:
2. Such "preference" can refer either to a deterministic ordering or a probabilistic ordering in which a violation of FOSD occurs when an agent chooses the dominated (risky-choice) alternative more than 50% of the time. 3. In contrast, it is second-order stochastic dominance that provides a well-defined nonparametric measure of riskiness (Hadar and Russell, 1969; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970) . For example, the cumulative probability distribution of payoffs G is "more risky than" the distribution F if G is a mean-preserving spread of F .
4. Software for probit and logit analysis does not use the seven observations in which subjects chose indifference rather than strict preference for option A or option B (coded as 0 and 1). Hence the parameter estimates are based on 293 observations. 
Subject Instructions
You will be paid an amount determined by your decisions in this experiment and the outcomes from rolling a die and drawing a numbered ball from a bingo cage.
The experiment proceeds as follows. First, you choose your preferred option in each of six tables. Second, which of the six tables will be selected for money payoff will be determined by rolling a six-sided die in your presence. The number that ends "up" on the die determines which one of your decision tables pays money.
Note that only one of your six decisions will be selected for money payoff by rolling the die; thus you should decide which option you prefer in each table independently of your choice in other tables.
You are asked to choose either option A or option B in each of six tables.
The example below shows the type of choice table that will be included in the experiment.
In Table 1 
A B I

Decision Pages
The response forms used in the experiment consist of six decision pages. Each decision page contains one of the following tables, summary instructions for the choice task in the table, and explanation of the lotteries on that page. Full text of the decision pages is available upon request to the authors. The decision pages were given to individual subjects in independently drawn random order. Subjects had access to all six decision pages while making their decisions on every page. One decision page for each subject was independently, randomly selected for money payoff.
Table Q
Option A Option B My Choice 
Questionnaire (with anonymous, coded responses)
Thank you very much for participating in our decision experiment. We would like to ask you a few questions. Your privacy is protected because your name will not appear on this questionnaire or on your decision tables.
Information about you:
